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An Emergent Consciousness of the Role of 
Christianity on Zimbabwe’s Political Field: A 









A distinct phenomenon of religio-political actors that emerged in Zimbabwe as 
a result of the socio-economic and political crises since 2000, alleged co-option 
and acquiescence of the mainline churches and the influence of globalisation, 
has received no more than fleeting attention in the academic discourse of 
religion in Zimbabwe’s political domain. Much of the available literature and 
research on religion and politics in Zimbabwe concentrates on the mainline 
church bodies and denominational histories, such as the Roman Catholic 
Church, Zimbabwe Council of Churches, or Zimbabwe Assemblies of God 
Africa. Non-doctrinal religio-political individuals and groups have been 
treated either as a marginal phenomenon or lumped together with confessional 
or 'conversionist' churches under the rubric of religious actors. This 
consequently obscures the uniqueness of emergent religio-political 
organizations that have assumed a civil society character in pursuit of broader 
political objectives such as democratization, without seeking political office. 
Drawing from fieldwork on three religio-political organizations in Zimbabwe 
namely the Zimbabwe Christian Alliance, Churches in Manicaland and Grace 
to Heal, this article argues that Zimbabwe is witnessing a new consciousness 
of the role of Christianity on the political field. Thus we require a nuanced 
analysis of religious formations within prevailing discourses on democrati-
zation, civil society, and religious freedom. 
 
Keywords: religio-political actors, co-option and acquiescence, mainline 
churches, non-doctrinal, democratization 






A distinct phenomenon of religious actors that emerged as a result of socio-
economic and political crises in Zimbabwe since 2000, alleged co-option and 
acquiescence of the mainline churches and the influence of globalisation, have 
not received much attention in the discourse of religion and the public domain. 
The role of religion in the public sphere has been dominated by a focus on 
mainline established church bodies and denominational histories, such as the 
Roman Catholic Church, Zimbabwe Council of Churches, or Zimbabwe 
Assemblies of God Africa (McLaughlin 1996; Kurewa 1997; Bhebe 1999; 
Maxwell 2006; Chimhanda 2008). Non-doctrinal1 religious civil society 
groups and individuals are treated as a marginal phenomenon or are lumped 
together with confessional or 'conversionist' churches under the rubric of 
religious actors (Kuperus 1999, Hallencreutz and Moyo 1988). This 
consequently obscures the uniqueness of new religio-political organizations 
that have emerged and assumed the character of civil society, to pursue 
political objectives, without seeking political office. Hence I concur with 
Hackett (2001: 122) that ‘a contextual analysis is needed within prevailing 
discourses on democratization, civil society, and religious freedom and the role 
of these religious formations therein’ at meso- and micro levels. 
 The emergent organisations do not merely resemble a new type of 
actors on the religious public domain, but is also evidence of the transformation 
of Christian religio-political practice, characterised by extra-institutional 
expressions of religion understood as how people of faith are keeping their 
faith alive outside or in addition to the institutional churches (Ganiel 2016). 
However two factors threaten to lead to the disappearance of these 
organisations: firstly their operations are contingent on competitive and scarce 
donor funding and secondly they operate a within politically hostile 
environment whose wish is to see them disappear. This article not only guards 
against their disappearance without trace, but also shows that in the face of 
unsatisfactory religio-political culture, dissatisfied coreligionists emerge, 
conglomerate and organise themselves in pursuit of broader political objectives 
without cutting ties with their mainline churches. This is a phenomenon and 
dynamic that has not been noted in scholarship, which results in an 
insider/outsider complex. The emergent actors operate outside the jurisdiction 
                                                          
1 Non-doctrinal refers to the state of not holding any particular doctrines or 






of the mainline churches because they do not conform to their approach to 
political affairs, but still agree on doctrines that are not linked to politics hence 
remain inside. The article demonstrates that it is possible for religionists not to 
confirm to established conventions on particular issues but still remain 
insiders. This goes contrary to the common perception that religious non-
conformism always results in schism. 
 Since independence in 1980, mainline Christian denominations and 
organisations enjoyed a rather cosy relationship with the Zimbabwean state. 
But in the last decade, in light of the state’s abuses of power and use of violence 
against its own citizens, new Christian organisations and individuals have 
emerged to question the propriety of this relationship. Wider processes of 
globalisation and secularisation have also affected how some religious actors 
in Zimbabwe view Christianity’s relationship with the state and the role of 
religion in the public sphere. Drawing on original research with three religio-
political organisations in Zimbabwe, the article explores how Christian groups 
are questioning old forms of spirituality and developing new ones. The article 
discusses the public discourses and socio-political projects developed by these 
groups, contrasting them to the relative silence and inactivity of many church 
institutions. It argues that structural features including a degree of separateness 
from mainline denominations, flexibility, and the ability to form networks with 
like-minded organisations play a key part in the effectiveness of religious 
actors in responding to political instability, conflict and violence. The article 
concludes that religious non-conformism is a potential resource for alternative 
ways of interpreting life and establishing social values. Religious non-
conformists, while smaller in number than their mainline counterparts, may 
exert a greater than imagined influence on cultural dynamics and political 
culture in Zimbabwe; hence it is important to articulate the context that gave 
rise to a new religio-political consciousness in Zimbabwe.  
 
 
The Contextual Framework of Political Economic and Social 
Crises 
The emergence of the religio-political organisations under study cannot be 
understood outside Zimbabwe’s political economy. It is the milieu that 
prompted their emergence. Zimbabwe attained independence from Britain in 
1980. However, the authoritarian political culture that had existed during the 





colonial era did not vanish with the introduction of a new government. 
Zimbabwe has been marred by violence since 1980 to the time during which 
the religio-political movements emerged. The following conflict and violence 
flashpoints are cases in point: Gukurahundi which was an attack on the second 
major tribe in the Midlands and Matebeleland provinces in Zimbabwe which 
began when mistrust grew between ZANU PF and the Zimbabwe African 
People’s Union (ZAPU). This dated from the time of integrating the Zimbabwe 
African National Liberation Army (ZANLA), the military wing of ZANU PF, 
Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA), the military wing of ZAPU 
and the Rhodesian army into one national army. Political violence, not just 
from 2008, but stretching back to 1980 and beyond has dominated election 
periods. Political institutions such as the security sector, the judiciary system, 
economic corruption, land reform programme, have contributed to 
institutionalisation of direct and structural violence (see Harold-Barry 2004). 
Operation Restore Oder, commonly known as Murambatsvina (a Shona 
language word which means get rid of the filth) where alleged illegal houses 
of ordinary people mostly in urban areas were demolished by the government 
was a crystal clear case of a state turning against its citizens (see Tibaijuka 
2008). The populace, which seemingly appears as rather religious, looked up 
to the mainline churches but they did not appear to live up to expectations in 




Whither Mainline Denominations and Churches 
Scholars such as Phiri (2001) advance the thesis that churches (ecumenically, 
denominationally or congregationally) intervene in national politics when a 
vacuum occurs in African political systems, when the state represses civil 
society organisations. I argue that developments in Zimbabwe show a different 
trajectory. Churches, in post-independence Zimbabwe, have not provided the 
required cognitive, emotional and moral guidance in dealing with the legacies 
of the political past as well as present political challenges to the government. 
In the mid-2000s, three of the historic mainline churches and their apex bodies, 
that is, the Zimbabwe Catholic Bishops’ Conference (ZCBC), Zimbabwe 
Council of Churches (ZCC) and Evangelical Fellowship of Zimbabwe (EFZ) 






African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU PF) and the Movement for 
Democratic Change (MDC). But ZANU-PF tried to co-opt these organisations 
and other prominent Christian leaders. For example, the government censored 
their discussion document ‘The Zimbabwe We Want’ developed by these 
bodies, before it was published, and wooed leaders with invitations to State 
House (Mpofu n.d.). Bishop Nemapere the head of the team that went to state 
house to meet the President is quoted as saying ‘we know we have a 
government that we must support, interact with and draw attention to concerns. 
Those of us who have different ideas about this country must know we have a 
government which listens (Mpofu n.d.:22)’. This meeting marked the end of 
the dialogue as sponsored by the churches and makes one conclude that the 
Church failed to rise above political patronage’ (see Tarusarira 2016). 
 Mainline church bodies were courted by political elites with gifts. This 
resonates with Haynes’ (1996) observation that mainstream religious 
organisations often have a mutually beneficial relationship with the state 
because of their strong desire to keep their religious influence, which can better 
be done in an environment of good rather than poor relations, and also because 
of a normative concern with stability as a good thing in itself. The institutional 
churches in Zimbabwe have therefore not challenged repression and 
oppression. This resulted in the emergence of new religio-political movements 
not focused on fixed and strict structure, authority and tradition, but flexible 
and fluid structures that can quickly and radically respond to issues of concern 
in society.  
 Some analysts (Chitando & Manyonganise 2011) have argued that the 
churches have been very critical of the regime’s oppressive tendencies as 
evidenced by the critical and strong pastoral letters they have published. 
However, Lapsley (1988:115-116) to my concurrence, laments that for other 
church leaders verbal opposition is sufficient indication of a commitment to 
justice, while for others pursuit of justice involves actions rather than words. 
As Brewer et. al (2011) have argued based on Northern Ireland churches, 
mainline churches often involve themselves in ritualized expressions of the 
social desirability of peace and reconciliation, trenchant denunciations of 
violence and atrocity, sometimes against all sides, occasionally one-sidedly, 
and criticism of perpetrators of violence. But they often rely on the power of 
‘the statement’, on ‘the word’, and the ‘good news’ explicit in Christian 
teaching, as if oratory were all that is important. This is instead of living out 
the commitment to social practices, involving commitment to behaviours, 





values, beliefs, and discursive formations that make peace a reality. Peace-
making and reconciliation should be made a habit, tradition, as well as an ideal, 
in which reconciliation affects the kinds of social relationships practitioners 
have and the social actions they perform in order to make a peaceful society. 
This will include speechifying but implementation of reconciliation by action 
is primary. Often they practice ‘elastic band leadership and leashed leadership’ 
(Brewer et al. 2011: 98). The former is understood as leadership that takes 
followers forwards but is cautious not to ‘break the elastic’, while the latter 
keeps a very tight leash on what it sees as the potentially damaging forms of 
mass populist action loitering just beneath the surface. Elsewhere, I have called 
these approaches theodicies of legitimation in contrast to theodicies of 
liberation (see Tarusarira 2014; see also Campbell 2010). 
 Pastoral letters regardless of how intellectually sharp and thorny they 
may be, appears to make the church distant from the people, and only provides 
interaction between the letter and the reader, or to be a little more fair, between 
the reader and the bishops, in an impersonal way, but do not provide a 
dialogical process. Issues of political instability, conflict and violence require 
direct interaction to resolve them and not a general approach. Hence I argue 
that if the pastoral letters are to be effective, they have to be deconstructed to 
be accessible to the grassroots. Thus Brewer et al. (2010: 1032), drawing from 
Galtung (1996) call the lack of more radical action, restriction to negative 
peace. The distinction between negative and positive peace is often traced to 
Galtung (1996:3). The former refers to the absence of violence, while the latter 
refers to achievement of fairness, justice and social redistribution. With respect 
to the mainline churches, negative peace refers to ‘the provision of pastoral 
care to the affected communities, criticisms of violence, calls for restraint, 
formulaic statements after each tragedy (Brewer et al. 2010: 1032). Thus 
despite numerous pastoral letters that were issued violence persisted on the 
political field (Zimudzi 2006: 201). In the end the approaches of mainline 
churches end up shoring up the political system. This prompted disgruntled 
Christians, who could not watch the prophetic voice and actions being 
compromised, to organize themselves outside the jurisdiction of the church 
structures to pursue broader political objectives. 
 
 
Enter Religio-political Movements 






century has witnessed religions ‘re-enter’ public space as influential discursive 
and symbolic systems, beyond the control of either traditional religious 
authoring institutions or states. In Africa, ‘re-entering’ should not be 
understood as in the case in societies where secularisation has made significant 
strides, but as increased politically engaged religious activity over time. As 
Ellis and ter Haar (1998:187) argue, there is no reason to suppose that religious 
belief ever declined in Africa. It would be most accurate to refer to the revival 
of public religion or revival of religion in the occupation of political space. 
Given the perceived ineffectiveness or low index of trust of groups like ZCBC, 
ZCC and EFZ it is not surprising that dissatisfied coreligionists have formed 
new extra-institutional groups and movements thereby demonstrating that 
Christianity in Zimbabwe has the potential to transform from being pietistic to 
challenge the political systems and engage with those at the margins of society 
and the oppressed. The emergence of these movements should also be viewed 
within the wider globalisation and now strained secularisation discourse.  
 As Robertson (1992:8) notes, globalisation refers to ‘both the 
compression of the world and the intensification of the world as a whole’ 
characterised by extensive connectivity and global consciousness (see 
Robertson 2003:6). It also substantially implies increased interdependence, 
involving both states and non-states in themes such as economic, 
developmental, social, political, technological, environmental, gender and 
human rights inter alia (Haynes 2007:65-95). What happens in one state affects 
others leading to an interconnected global context of action. For the purposes 
of this article transnational activity and globalisation are understood as religion 
expanding explosively, stimulated by secular global processes in contemporary 
times (Rudolph 1997:1). The modus operandi of globalisation involves 
neoliberal2 approaches such as civil society and social movement approaches, 
network society, decentralisation and bottom-up politics as responsive 
strategies. In the vein of secularisation the aforementioned themes and 
strategies are mediated through the use of rationalisation and impersonal 
criteria to decide, allocate and adjudicate (Beyer 1994). To mention 
secularisation is not to assert that Zimbabwe has been secularised. Zimbabwe 
is a complex situation in which I prefer to talk of secularisation of the state and 
                                                          
2 Neoliberal approaches sometimes include cooperating with multinationals or 
funders who may want to implant their agendas, thereby making it difficult for 
local organisations to respond to local needs (see Bradley 2009:272) 





not of the society. The politically engaged religious movements in question 
busy themselves with and employ the globally acclaimed issues and strategies 
respectively within the Zimbabwean context. This raises the question of 
whether the religious and the secular can be easily and hermetically separated. 
Hence developments on the global stage have also influenced the religio-
political response to the body politik in Zimbabwe.  
 Globalisation is not only material or techno-economic but also cultural 
and political involving consciousness, cognitive schema, models of authority, 
and goals of progress (Thomas 2007: 36) transmitted through international 
linkages and through rational instrumental means (global rationalism). This 
implies responding to wider social processes that are rendering former 
understandings of territory, society and cultural identity problematic (Coleman 
2000:4-5). Due to global communication networks (Haynes 2007) political, 
social and economical global developments reach various locales faster than 
before the advent of globalisation, and ‘people, cultures, societies and 
civilisations previously separated are now in regular unavoidable contact 
(Beyer 1994:2). Globalisation smacks of oneness of place and time (Beyer 
1994) leading to a world culture comprised of things, identities and models of 
action that are pervasive throughout the world (Thomas 2007:37). One can 
therefore not underestimate the transnational influence of events such as the 
September 11 attacks, the role of religion in fighting apartheid in South Africa, 
the role of Roman Catholicism in formation of the Solidarity movement in 
Poland, the Iranian revolution in 1978, inter alia. Globalisation has therefore 
served to influence religious organisations to adopt new or renewed agendas. 
This process should not be viewed as mere adoption of global views but 
negotiation of global processes and construction of new agendas and processes.  
  Globalisation has drawn actors into extensive networks and layers of 
regional and international governance, thereby creating a collective weight in 
the form of global civil society capable of challenging hegemonic discourses 
(Bradley 2009:268). Some of these agendas include internationally acclaimed 
values such as social development and human rights inter alia. In addition to 
the use of information communication and technology to broadcast their 
messages, these movements have forged international links for resource 
mobilisation and in a search for solidarity, since ‘transnational movements 
magnify beliefs and grievances expressed at local level’ (Bradley 2009:269). 
While globalisation and modernisation puts religion into question, it is the 






religion to politically engaged religious movements (see Thomas 2007:37-39). 
Due to the dialogical interaction of globalisation and religion, traditional 
religion across the world could not remain the same. 
  Between 2012 and 2014 I carried out qualitative research on three 
organisations namely Zimbabwe Christian Alliance (ZCA), Churches in 
Manicaland (province) (CiM), and Grace to Heal (GtH). I selected and 
analysed these religious movements as one dimension within the larger corpus 
of civil society. I focused on their culture, organisation and their operational 
environment. The coordinator of ZCA described the organisation as ‘a network 
of faith-based groups and individuals with a calling in peace and justice work’. 
In explaining what prompted the founding of the organisation he referred to a 
government sponsored exercise called Operation Restore Order/ 
Murambatsvina (refuse dirt) which left more than 700,000 urban informal 
settlers homeless under the guise of restoring order and rooting out illegal 
activities through destroying illegal structures. Emerging from this was that the 
root cause of Murambatsvina or the destroying of people's homes could really 
be traced back to bad governance. But at that time there was a vacuum which 
the recognised churches were not speaking out about, nor did they move in to 
assist. ZCA realised that in order to deal with the deeper problem of Zimbabwe, 
which in their view is bad governance, numerous governance strands needed 
attention. These strands included a new constitution, processes of national 
healing and an election process. They decided they ‘would engage on issues of 
justice without conforming to the status quo that was there but in order to create 
a new wine skin that we would use to engage with our context’, according to 
the Coordinator. ZCA derives its mandate from the Bible, particularly Psalm 
82:1-4 which says ‘God presides in the great assembly; he gives judgement 
among the gods. How long will you defend the unjust and show partiality to 
the wicked? Defend the cause of the weak and fatherless; maintain the rights 
of the weak and oppressed. Rescue the weak and needy; Deliver them from the 
hand of the wicked’ (Newsletter March 2008). 
 Towards its objectives, ZCA had to articulate certain strategic 
activities which included some of the following, similar to those associated 
with globalisation, especially neoliberal approaches: public prayer meetings, 
workshops to empower volunteer activists and create awareness on various 
political challenges and empower people with skills for post-conflict 
reconciliation and counselling, writing workshops aimed at responsible 
journalism in the face of state controlled journalism that breeds hatred and 





tension. It has also issued out position papers, published a newsletter to share 
its reflections on topical issues in the country. For some of its activities it has 
been subjected to police brutality and arrests. Influenced by its adoption of the 
global human rights and civil society discourse in addition to the local 
initiatives, ZCA endeavoured to create extensive regional and international 
networks and layers to create a collective weight in the form of global civil 
society capable of challenging hegemonic discourses. To this end it has 
interacted with regional and global actors. Some of its workshops have been 
facilitated by founder of the Institute for Healing of Memories South Africa, 
Fr Michael Lapsley (April-May Newsletter 2009:5). In 2009 the Archbishop 
of Uppsala Church of Sweden and his delegation visited Zimbabwe and met 
with the leadership of ZCA with whom they reflected upon the crises in the 
country. On the regional front, a case in point is ZCA’s engagement with church 
leaders and civil society groups from Tanzania, Botswana, South Africa and 
Swaziland. ZCA members say that they have been encouraged by the activities 
of people such as Bishop Paul Verryn of the Methodist Church in Johannesburg 
who has offered Zimbabwean political and economic refugees shelter, and who 
it honoured with a Justice and Peace Award. ZCA has partnered with 
international actors such as Tear Fund UK and has participated at global 
platforms to articulate various political issues with respect to the Zimbabwean 
crises. 
 Churches in Manicaland (Manicaland is a Province in Eastern 
Zimbabwe) is an ‘ecumenical’ gathering of members from Christian 
denominations and organizations in the province of Manicaland. It was formed 
in 2000 at the time of great violence and uncertainty, intimidation and violence. 
The use of the word ‘churches’ does not here refer to the institutional church 
but to individual Christians, who would not be able to speak at high-ranking 
platforms unlike mainline bodies. In a demonstration of decentralisation, CiM 
refers to itself as a forum or a loose platform without a formal structure of 
leadership. This strategically makes it difficult for the state security to pick on 
anyone as the point person of the forum, prevents possible leadership wrangles 
and makes it accessible to everyone involved. In a depiction of the influence 
of globalisation, one founder member expressing her motivation to be part of 
CiM said: 
 
At the time I was working with the All Africa Conference of Churches 






immediately I recognised what I had seen in other countries that we 
were in a crises which was going to be uprooting a large number of 
people if we were not going to be careful. That is where my motivation 
came from. I was also a member of Commission on the World Council 
of Churches on International Affairs so I had the international 
perspective as well (interview with a founding member) 
  
Institutional churches tend to be conservative and rigid (Kull 2010: 124). 
Thus CiM prides itself on flexibility. One Catholic interviewee said: 
 
That is the main reason why I am so passionate about CiM. In as much 
as I have done a lot with the Catholic Justice and Peace commission, 
the bureaucratic nature and the limitations within the Catholic Church 
are problematic, I would say for example if there is a crisis, I must go 
to the Bishop, and it takes about 2 to 3 weeks before a statement is 
passed and by the time it is passed, it is no longer relevant. These are 
limitations I don’t find in CiM. We sit down and say this is what we 
want to do. It’s done and it will be relevant. It will be up to time and 
relevant …. I find CiM more flexible and giving room for innovations 
for practical interventions. 
 
To further explain the institutional inertia of mainline churches and bodies in 
favour of decentralisation and bottom-up politics as responsive strategies, a 
thinking derivable from the globalisation discourse, a CiM interviewee, a 
founding member, narrated that on behalf of CiM, she went to ZCC and spoke 
to its ‘official’ and the way the official responded, according to her, showed 
her where the problem was. She says the official was not a man of great 
decision, and she said to him, ‘I think if we miss this moment in the history of 
Zimbabwe, we the churches are going to have a hard time relating to whatever 
develops from this’. When CiM attempted to make use of the national heads 
of churches to take concerns to the national political leaders, it received a very 
slow and muted response until it wrote a letter to ZCC outlining its 
dissatisfaction. She further asserted that the church leaders were not well 
organised: 
 
In 1980 they worked together as a fantastic team on repatriation and 
reintegration of refugees after the liberation war, but after that it was 





just a tip, they met here and there and swapped stories, so they were 
not really oriented towards picking up stories from the ground and 
running up like that. We decided to write them a letter to tell them 
where we stand from Manicaland province and how we see things. We 
signed our names as individual denominations. That particular letter 
had about 40 names. 
 
In terms of strategy CiM deployed bottom up and grassroots approaches. It 
used newsletters which it started using during the election periods as a way to 
educate voters. It emphasized voting responsibly, abstaining from violence, 
voting for something they believed has a future for them and their children 
inter alia. It distributed flyers and newsletters at various places including bus 
terminuses where its members gave travellers the newsletters and pamphlets to 
take to the remotest of places in the rural areas. CiM members have visited 
some chiefs in Manicaland province, to express their concern about violence 
that was taking place in their chiefdoms. It reports that some chiefs were happy 
that CiM had visited them. Since the institution of the chiefs had been 
politicised by the ZANU PF government, others viewed CiM as a group of 
politicians advocating for the opposition party MDC. This perception is based 
on the fact that the language of CiM sounds similar to that of the MDC, 
especially the emphasis on respect for human rights, democracy and freedoms. 
This is a language that ZANU PF has not been entertaining since the late 1990s. 
CiM formed teams such as a rapid response team that responded immediately 
to acts of arson in the province. The team would respond by moving in to stop 
any violent situations and also publicise the acts to the world. It would make 
known the presence of groups wielding sticks and spears. Anybody who 
wanted to send messages about a problem could immediately do so and the 
team would respond immediately. Since the whites had become direct victims 
due to the land question in which the government expropriated land from them, 
another group looking into race relations was established, as was one looking 
into youth expectations. A research team was put up to substantiate and inform 
CiM activities. CiM organised workshops for interested pastors from all 
religious denominations in Manicaland because it felt violence was not 
discriminating anybody on grounds of religion. Because pastors were living in 
fear, the workshops became a source of solidarity and ideas. The preceding 







CiM engaged political elites in an effort to rope them into the fight 
against all forms of political violence, especially between political parties. 
People who did not support one particular party were subjected to violence 
through beatings or having their houses burnt. CiM therefore engaged the 
governor of the province and asked her to make a statement for peace in the 
province. Likewise the chief of police and the Electoral Commission officials 
were engaged to facilitate peaceful elections and co-existence in the province. 
Speaking at the Joint Monitoring and Implementation Committee (JOMIC) 
provincial stakeholders’ conference in Mutare. Reverend M3 demanded that 
churches be incorporated in the activities of this body because CIM believed 
that religious actors have power and influence in pacifying the nation 
(Manayiti 2012).  
 The Director of GtH narrated that the organization was formed during 
the time of land upheavals and the consequent political, economic and political 
instability. In this development, of interest to GtH is not the land question per 
se, but the violence that was associated with it. The land question became a 
watershed of violence in Zimbabwe. Issues of concern to GtH, were not 
restricted to the late 1990s and early 2000s. They included 1980s massacres in 
Matabeleland province, known as 'Gukurahundi'. However, it was also 
prompted by the violent farm invasions and seizures, the 2005 'Operation 
Restore Order/Murambatsvina', violence against opposing party activists and 
supporters during election times which saw many people being killed, severely 
maimed and properties vandalised. From the Baptist Church of Bulawayo 
members of GtH reflected on what they needed to do in the face of the political 
crisis. Coming from Matabeleland province, they decided upon Gukurahundi 
as the starting point. An interviewee said:  
 
The motivation is basically that we are called to be peace makers. Jesus 
is the healer and he is the prince of peace and so as a Christian 
organisation, we were guided particularly by I Cor 5: 18 ff which says 
he has given unto us the message of reconciliation. There is a context 
of us reconciling to God but we do believe it can be applied broader 
than just that. 
 
                                                          
3 Interview partner made anonymus. 





GtH aims to be part and parcel of the political transformation paying special 
attention to the challenges of the people of Matabeleland province. It does not 
believe in being silenced as they believe other church actors have been. One 
respondent said: 
 
Critiquing the political processes is not foreign to religious actors. We 
believe it is actually in line with the duties and responsibilities of 
pastors if we look at people like Hosiah, Jeremiah, Amos and others. 
The way Amos in particular speaks, that could have been called 
meddling in political issues. The church must maintain a critical 
distance - not too far, not too near to politics as an organisation. 
Individuals within the church can do that. If you are a church pastor 
then don’t get involved in partisan politics because you have all sorts 
of people from all political dimensions coming to your church on 
Sunday. If you take political sides that will destroy the unity and 
harmony within the church.  
 
When I asked the mainline church leaders’ perspective on religio-political 
organisations, they were very critical of them. Rev. Dr. P’s4 response is 
representative of the views: 
 
These organizations [religio-political organizations] claim to be civic 
organizations and it appears as though the agenda that they pursue is 
clearly a political agenda which has taken a position, an ideological 
posturing which is more critical than supportive of pan-Africanist 
nationalist liberation agenda driven movements. Their agendas and 
programs of action are tied to certain foreign ideological interests, of 
the donor basis. Their type of understanding of politics is a largely 
liberal and neo-colonial version of democracy. They seem not to 
entertain in their definitions or in their visions of democracy, social 
democratic models of democracy that are socialist, that are home 
grown, African. They seem to be very pre-occupied with a slate or 
template democracy template that is simply transposed out of the Euro-
American template which is liberal, very individualistic etc. in terms 
of democracy. They are more biased towards the liberal democratic 
                                                          






model and template, freedom of expression, freedom of speech etc. 
And they talk less about the freedom of our sovereignty, the freedom 
to retain our sovereignty as a people, the freedom to retain our identity 
as a people.  
 
A variety of conceptions can be distilled from the above response. Mainline 
church leaders perceive the emergent religio-political organizations as political 
organizations under a sacred canopy. Like other civic society organizations, 
they are interested in getting money from donors and are an expression of neo-
colonialism. This dovetails with the conception that civil society and 
globalization are part of the neo-colonial discourse. For others civil society is 
a concept suited to the political reality of Western society. It cannot sufficiently 
explain the power complexities of African associational life, because it fails to 
understand the domination of African societies by a predatory state, the 
informal character of many forms of organization and the fundamental roles 
played by class and ethnicity (Maina 1998:137). Ferguson (1998: 3-4) argues 
that the current use of the concept in the study of African politics serves to 
legitimate a profoundly anti-democratic form of transnational politics. NGOs 
do not challenge the state from below but are horizontal contemporaries of 
wider institutions of transnational governmentality. No wonder Rev. Dr. P 
asserts that the organizations are pre-occupied with the Euro-American 
template who the ruling regime accuses of wanting to recolonize Zimbabwe, a 
discourse the ruling regime has deployed to explain why the economy has 
failed. The resonance of Rev Dr. P’s perception with that of the ruling regime 
confirms the alleged co-option by and alliance with the ruling party. His 
critique is not to be uncritically dismissed considering that the religio-political 
actors have for the most part been foreign funded from Europe and the US. 
Though, it could be argued that foreign funding is not equal to bringing in 
Euro-American values, Dr. P does have a point which religio-political actors 
have difficulties adequately responding to. Rev. Dr. P is suspicious of the neo-
liberal values of people’s freedoms and defends a pan-African nationalist 
liberation agenda advocated by the ruling regime. This makes him be accused 
of being in alliance with the ruling regime More striking is that he spoke more 
like a political party enthusiast rather than a religious leader. It is difficult to 
distinguish the two identities in him just as it is with other mainline church 
leaders in Zimbabwe. 
 A Catholic Church leader criticised these organisations saying:  





They came on the stage being very confrontational, attacking not 
only the government but also attacking the churches, saying the 
churches are not doing anything, and putting themselves forward 
as the church…you cannot build a country through confrontation, 
because on the other hand the mainline churches always had their 
strategy of engagement, dialogue hopefully then that would lead 
to transformation. 
 
It becomes worthy to invoke the three dimensions through which religion 
enters the public sphere. Casanova (1994: 218) posits that religion can be 
public firstly at the state level where established state churches exist or 
churches are in search of the state; secondly at the political society level, where 
religious movements resist disestablishment and differentiation, or the 
mobilisations and counter-mobilisations of religious groups and confessional 
parties against other religions or against secularist movements and parties, or 
religious groups mobilised in defence of religious freedom, or religious 
institutions demanding the rule of law and the legal protection of human rights, 
or protecting the mobilisation of civil society and defending the 
institutionalisations of democratic regimes; and thirdly at the civil society level 
inclusive of hegemonic civil religions and the public intervention of religious 
groups in the undifferentiated sphere of civil society. Regarding Zimbabwe’s 
political sphere, religion, especially mainline churches has been public at the 
level of the state. The emergent religio-political organizations are public at the 
political and civil society. Assuming civil socety identity might also be 
perceived as adopting Euro-American templates not suitable in an African 
associational contexts, not unless one perceives civil society not in its 
ethnocentricity, that is where it originated but focuses on the sociological 
features. 
  Mainline churches therefore are against the approaches of the religio-
political organisations which as alluded to earlier are derivable from the 
globalization discourse. This analysis is not bent on belittling the systems and 
structures of mainline churches entirely. It must be noted that mainline 
churches possess structures, systems and personnel which can be deployed in 
the pursuit for political transformation, while religio-political organizations are 
issue focused and possess the sense of urgency and action. The mainline 
churches should observe that silent diplomacy in the face of violence may 






stakeholders more critically, work closely with non-conformists, do more 
research and capacitate the clergy beyond philosophy and theology, to be able 
to read the times. Religio-political organizations should observe that activism 
must not blur reflection and dialogue. Action without reflection is said to be 
blind activism, while word and reflection without action is mere rhetoric. Some 
oversights have already been noted. Religio-political organizations end up 
much more results oriented and overlooking issues such as the role of women 
and non-Christian religions in confronting the Zimbabwean crisis. The 
harmonization between mainline churches and religio-political organizations 
is not yet in full swing. However initiatives such as the Church and Civil 
Society Forum in which some mainline churches and religio-political 
organizations meet, together with ‘secular’ civil society organizations, to 
discuss civic matters, show an acknowledgement by all actors that they need 




Religio-political organisations operating outside the jurisdiction of the 
mainline churches challenge both the state and the churches. Firstly they do 
not conform to the political elites’ conception of how the religious should 
participate in politics. The movements tackle those issues which are politically 
sensitive in a manner that exposes the political elites especially those from the 
ruling ZANU PF party. The state does not allow open and public discussion of 
these issues or has even banned the discussion all together as it has done with 
the Gukurahundi issue referred to above. Legislation is put into place to control 
the flow of information. A case in point of such laws is the Access to 
Information and Protection of Privacy Act. Addressing these issues attracts the 
wrath and stick of the state. However the movements in question override these 
sanctions. 
 The strategies that these organisations employ signify an attempt to 
bring back the public sphere as a site of discussion of common public affairs 
and to organise against arbitrary and oppressive forms of social action and 
public power. The strategies have a dual effect of mobilising and gathering 
people, and enlightening people about their dues as citizens. Demonstrations, 
prayer rallies, workshops inter alia are opted for as ways to reach out to many 
people. For the state, gathering people in the public square is threatening as we 





saw with the Arab spring. Violent disruption of the meetings and arrests 
become a sanctioning measure for the state. No wonder in 2007 the ZCA had 
a meeting violently disrupted under the Public Order and Security Act (POSA) 
resulting in arrests and many getting injured in 2007. 
 Secondly the emergent movements do not conform to the political 
approaches of the mainline churches, and vice-versa, the mainline churches are 
opposed to the strategies involved in the work of the non-conformist emergent 
organisations. They opt for back door silent diplomacy which only works in 
normal situations where the state respects the rule of law and respects the 
principles of participatory democracy and not in abnormal situations such as 
the one Zimbabwe had degenerated into. The reaction from the mainline 
church leaders shows a conflictive frame of values between them and the 
emergent movements. 
 The state seems to welcome the humanitarian and social contribution 
of religious actors but does not allow for a critical and active contribution to 
political issues by them. Instead of the secularisation of the state policy 
working to safeguard the freedom of choice and conscience, without the state 
privileging any belief or religion, the policy is used to justify the exclusion and 
repression of critical religious voices. It is used to delimit the realms within 
which religious actors can participate or cannot. The state sanctions adopt and 
co-opt other religious churches and organisations so that they provide it with 
the sacred canopy. This is selective application of the policy of secularisation 
of the state if not a direct affront to it. 
 Organisation structures and systems can be enabling or limiting in the 
pursuit for social change. It emerges from the case studies that hierarchically 
and bureaucratically structured institutions are less strategically positioned to 
quickly make decisions and mobilise for action, a requirement in an 
environment where there is constant and live jostling for power and resources, 
than loosely connected and led.  
 Despite being labelled agents of re-colonisation by the state, ZCA has 
claimed a seat at the constitution making process table in 2013. ZCA is also a 
pioneer of the Church and Civil Society Forum, an initiative meant to facilitate 
national healing and reconciliation through engaging the grassroots 
communities and the political elites. CiM has managed to engage both the 
grassroots and handing petitions to and engaging the political elites of its 
province. 






monial politics, a system though which power and resources lie in the hands of 
those with high political connections, at the expense of the common people. 
The strategies employed by the non-conformists have been an antidote to this 
culture. The organisations in question, while pressurizing the elites, have the 
grassroots as an important stakeholder in the endeavour for political 
transformation. They have put emphasis on the grassroots as the basis for an 
effective political transformation, who must be brought back into Zimbabwe’s 
public sphere. The emergence of these religio-political organisations, opens up 
avenues for further research. More similar organisations and individuals are 
emerging. At the time of writing, one Pastor Evan Mawarire had mobilized 
Zimbabwean citizens, via social media to stand up and express their 
dissatisfaction with the government’s failure to turn around the economy and 
curb corruption by political elites. The movement called #ThisFlag went viral 
and Pastor Mawarire was arrested and brought to court. Civil society 
organisations and citizens expressed unprecedented support by turning up at 
the court, singing and praying outside the court as proceedings went on. 
Mawarire was eventually released without charge. He fled to the United States. 
After six months he returned and was arrested on arrival at the Harare 
International airport. More research thus need to be undertaken regarding the 
role of religious actors in politics and their use of Information and 
Communication Technology (ICTs) including the social media. The 
involvement of religious actors in politics as exemplified by the organisations 
discussed in this article and religious leaders like Mawarire triggers the need 
to problematise and nuance the binary separation religion and politics as well 
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